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“Constitutional Chicken”:
National Security Confidentiality and
Terrorism Prosecutions after
R. v. Ahmad
Kent Roach*
I. INTRODUCTION
In R. v. Ahmad,1 the Supreme Court unanimously ruled that the
exclusive jurisdiction of the Federal Court to make national security
confidentiality determinations under section 38 of the Canada Evidence Act2 did not violate the inherent jurisdiction of the provincial
superior courts or the section 7 rights of the accused. In reaching this
conclusion, the Court relied on the fact that the criminal trial court
could stay proceedings if it concluded that a fair trial was not possible
in light of a non-disclosure order made by the Federal Court or if the
trial judge lacked enough information about the non-disclosed secret
information to determine its effects on the fairness of the trial. The
Court stressed that the drastic remedy of a stay of proceedings was
statutorily authorized under section 38.14 of the Canada Evidence Act.
The statutory stay should be ordered if the trial court had any doubt
about whether a fair trial was possible including in cases where the
clearest case for a stay of proceedings had not been established under
the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms3 or abuse of process
doctrine.

*
Professor of Law and Prichard Wilson Chair in Law and Public Policy, University of
Toronto. I thank Jamie Cameron and Anil Kapoor for helpful comments on an early draft.
1
[2011] S.C.J. No. 6, 2011 SCC 6 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Ahmad 2011”].
2
R.S.C. 1985, c. C-5.
3
Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.),
1982, c. 11 [hereinafter “Charter”].
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The Court suggested that what the parties characterized as a game of
“constitutional chicken”4 in Canada’s two-court procedure could be avoided
through a “sensible”,5 “practical”,6 “flexible”7 and Charter compliant
interpretation of section 38 of the Canada Evidence Act. The Court’s
reinterpretation of section 38, however, was quite modest and only
required that the accused receive notice of the section 38 proceedings in
relation to non-disclosure proceedings in the Federal Court. The Court
did not require that the trial judge be given access to the non-disclosed
information or have the power to revise the Federal Court’s nondisclosure order. This article suggests that national security confidentiality after Ahmad 2011 still involves a dangerous game of constitutional
chicken in which trial judges will have to threaten to use statutory stays
and the Attorney General of Canada will have to decide whether to crash
a terrorism prosecution or at the last minute release enough information
to avoid a section 38.14 stay.
The Supreme Court in Ahmad 2011 may have thought it could avoid
games of constitutional chicken by sending clear signals that, contrary to
previous practice, trial judges should have access to any secret information that the Federal Court ordered should not be disclosed to the
accused. The Court encouraged trial judges to threaten to use a statutory
stay to induce either the Federal Court or the Attorney General of Canada
to provide such access. Although the Court’s attempt to provide such
access is laudable and may be successful, it will not avoid a game of
constitutional chicken that threatens, perhaps needlessly, to stay major
terrorism prosecutions.
Even if they have access to the non-disclosed secret material, trial
judges still will be powerless to revise any non-disclosure order made by
the Federal Court. The Federal Court’s non-disclosure orders are generally made at a pre-trial stage long before the issues in the trial, including
the accused’s defence, have crystallized. The trial judge may conclude
that even if a non-disclosure order was justified at the pre-trial stage, it
can no longer be justified given the issues that have emerged at trial.
Unlike their counterparts in Australia, the United Kingdom and the
United States, however, Canadian trial judges will remain powerless after
Ahmad 2011 to revise the original non-disclosure orders. Trial judges will
4
5
6
7

Ahmad 2011, supra, note 1, at para. 34.
Id., at para. 34.
Id., at para. 72.
Id., at para. 50.
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only be able to threaten and to use a section 38.14 stay even if a revised
non-disclosure order is a more appropriate remedy to reconcile the
competing interests in secrecy and disclosure and ensure a fair trial. The
only actor who can avoid the drastic remedy of a stay at this point is the
Attorney General of Canada who retains powers to allow secret information to be disclosed despite a non-disclosure order from the Federal
Court. After Ahmad 2011, a high stakes game of constitutional chicken
will be played between trial judges threatening to stay terrorism prosecutions and the Attorney General of Canada deciding whether to allow
enough information to be disclosed to avoid a stay.
The first part of this article examines the history and context in
which national security confidentiality questions arise. It will show that
the choice of the Federal Court to decide national security confidentiality
issues in 1982 was related to Canada’s traditional anxieties as a net
importer of intelligence about revealing the secrets of others. These
anxieties had Cold War roots stemming back to the Gouzenko spy
revelations, but they are anachronistic in a modern age where terrorism is
now widely regarded as the main threat to national security and secret
intelligence will often have evidentiary uses in legal proceedings.
The second part examines the trial judge’s ruling that was overturned
on direct appeal in Ahmad 2011 as well as some of the related national
security confidentiality rulings that he made during the trial. This
discussion shows that the trial judge was more aware of the practical
aspects of section 38 litigation than the Supreme Court. In particular, the
trial judge was aware that section 38 applications could arise at multiple
points during the trial and result in multiple appeals including appeals
during the middle of a jury trial. The trial judge was also more aware
than the Supreme Court of the practical nature of the section 38 process
in which decisions relating to disclosure are made by counsel instructed
by the Attorney General of Canada who does not bear ultimate responsibility for the prosecution. Finally, the trial judge seemed to be more
aware than the Supreme Court of the practical burdens of staying
proceedings and allowing those accused of very serious crimes that had
attracted global attention to walk free without a trial on the merits.
The third part of the article analyzes the Supreme Court’s decision in
Ahmad 2011.8 In a second generation form of “constitutional minimal-

8

Supra, note 1.
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ism”,9 the Court relied on statutory interpretation to hold that section 38
did not violate section 7 of the Charter. This approach, however, optimistically assumes that those who administer section 38, especially trial
judges, will always correctly apply fine grained constitutional standards
relating to a fair trial. The reliance that the Court places on the statutory
stay under section 38.14 begs the question of what would happen if
Parliament did not include statutory guarantees. In particular, the Court
attempted to assign responsibility for stays to Parliament, even though
trial judges will have ultimate responsibility for protecting the Charter
right to a fair trial. The Court concluded that section 38 does not violate
superior court powers under section 96 of the Constitution Act, 186710 on
the basis that courts historically did not question the executive’s national
security confidentiality claims. This approach will be criticized for
transforming weighty separation of powers issues into narrow historical
questions; constitutionalizing Cold War Canada’s excessive concerns
about secrecy; and discounting the evolving role of superior courts in a
constitutional democracy. The Court also downplayed how section 38
determinations in a criminal trial are inextricably intertwined with
constitutional rights to disclosure and a fair trial and constitutional
remedies.
The fourth part of this article will speculate on how the constitutional
game of chicken under section 38 might play out in the future. Though
the Court stressed that its decision to uphold section 38 did not resolve
the policy issue, the two-court system is likely to remain. The government has shown no interest in reforming section 38 in its response to the
Air India Commission’s recommendations that criminal trial judges be
allowed to make section 38 determinations or in new legislation on fair
and efficient criminal trials. Specially designated Federal Court judges
and special advocates will play a role under section 38, but the major
players in the game of constitutional chicken will be trial judges who will
be required to threaten and perhaps issue stays and the Attorney General
of Canada who will often have the exclusive power to authorize enough
disclosure to avoid a stay.

9
10

Cass R. Sunstein, One Case at a Time (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1999).
(U.K.) 30 & 31 Vict, c. 3, reprinted in R.S.C. 1985, App. II, No. 5.
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II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND AND POLICY CONTEXT
As the Supreme Court noted in Ahmad 2011,11 Canada is alone
among the democracies in bifurcating public interest immunity applications for non-disclosure on grounds of national security confidentiality
between the trial judge and a specialized security court, in this case the
10 or so judges of the Federal Court who are specially designated to deal
with section 38 and other matters involving information that the government claims is secret. Australia, the United Kingdom and the United
States all allow trial judges to have access to the secret information and
to decide whether and when it should be disclosed to the accused. Why
has Canada refused to trust trial judges with such responsibilities?
Canada was one of the last democracies to move away from complete judicial deference to governmental claims of secrecy. Until 1982,
the relevant national security confidentiality provision provided:
41(2) When a Minister of the Crown certifies to any court by
affidavit that the production or discovery of a document or its contents
would be injurious to international relations, national defence or
security, or to federal-provincial relations, or that it would disclose a
confidence of the Queen’s Privy Council for Canada, discovery and
production shall be refused without any examination of the document
by the court.12

This provision reflected concerns about secrecy that started right after the
Second World War when Igor Gouzenko, a clerk at the Soviet embassy in
Ottawa, defected and revealed an espionage ring in Canada. In response,
Canada appointed an inquiry chaired by two Supreme Court judges. The
inquiry acted very aggressively, detaining and interrogating people in
secret and without counsel with subsequent prosecutions under the
Official Secrets Act.13 The Commission concluded that “much vital
technical information which should still be secret to the authorities of
Canada, Great Britain and the United States, has been made known to the
Russians by reason of the espionage activities reported on herein”.14 This
conclusion underlined how Canada’s secrets were often the secrets of its
more powerful allies. The implicit message, one still strongly felt in
11

Supra, note 1, at para. 71.
Federal Court Act, R.S.C. 1970, c. 10 (2nd Supp.).
13
S.C. 1939, c. 49.
14
Hon. Robert Taschereau & Hon. R.I. Kellock, The Report of the Royal Commission
(Ottawa: Kings Press, 1946), at 618.
12
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Ottawa, is that Canada should do all that it can to protect such secrets.
There are strong concerns that if Canada risks secrets it may receive less
intelligence from our more powerful allies, especially the United States.
This sets up a strong and self-sustaining equation between secrecy
and security.
In 1982, the above absolute secrecy provision was challenged in litigation involving human rights complaints made by two women who
were fired from their jobs as a switchboard operator and a waitress,
respectively, at the Montreal Olympics on the basis of an undisclosed
security report by the RCMP. The Supreme Court unanimously upheld
the constitutionality of the provision noting that the risk that the executive would invoke absolute Crown privilege maliciously or arbitrarily
“does not have the effect of divesting Parliament of its power to legislate
… saying that Parliament and the legislatures cannot make the privilege
absolute amounts to a denial of parliamentary supremacy …”.15 This
decision is striking in its pre-Charter celebration of Parliamentary
supremacy.
The absolute nature of the national security privilege was changed in
1982 in anticipation of the Charter. Nevertheless, old habits of absolute
secrecy died hard. In the 1980s, the Federal Court was often reluctant to
exercise its new powers to examine material that was subject to national
security confidentiality claims let alone order them disclosed.16 A
terrorism prosecution in the 1980s was allowed to proceed to conviction
even though neither the trial judge nor the Federal Court examined
Canadian Security Intelligence Service (“CSIS”) surveillance records to
determine if they should be disclosed to the accused.17 A reluctance by
the courts to challenge secrecy claims presented obvious threats to rights
protection, but it also meant that governmental agencies did not have to
justify the necessity and the proportionality of their secrecy claims.
The Canadian emphasis on secrecy was also facilitated by the 1984
creation of the CSIS with an explicit mandate to collect secret intelligence. Much stress was placed on the fact that CSIS, unlike the former
15
Canada (Commission des droits de la personne) v. Canada (Attorney General), [1982]
S.C.J. No. 3, [1982] 1 S.C.R. 215, at 228 (S.C.C.).
16
See, for example, Henrie v. Canada (Security Intelligence Review Committee), [1988]
F.C.J. No. 965, 53 D.L.R. (4th) 568, affd [1992] F.C.J. No. 100, 88 D.L.R. (4th) 575 (F.C.A.)
[hereinafter “Henrie”].
17
Kevork v. Canada, [1984] F.C.J. No. 178, 17 C.C.C. (3d) 426 (F.C.T.D.). See Kent
Roach, The Unique Challenges of Terrorism Prosecutions (Ottawa: Ministry of Public Works,
2010), at 210-21.
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security service of the RCMP, did not have law enforcement powers.
This factor, combined with the Cold War emphasis on espionage and
counter-intelligence as opposed to terrorism, meant that CSIS insisted
that it did not collect material that might have to be disclosed as evidence. In 1987, a Special Senate Committee on Terrorism stressed that
while CSIS, when possible, should cooperate with prosecutions, it should
not “gather evidence to support criminal prosecutions”, and its cooperation should never prejudice “the safety of CSIS officers, their contacts, or
important ongoing investigations”.18 In 1988, one of the specially
designated judges of the Federal Court emphasized the danger of
disclosing secret intelligence that was innocuous on its face. He stressed
the dangers of disclosing information obtained from “exchanges of
information between friendly countries of the western world”.19 Secret
intelligence was completely different than public evidence and “more often
than not … completely inadmissible as evidence in any court of law”.20
Until the Supreme Court’s 2008 decision in Charkaoui v. Canada
(Citizenship and Immigration),21 CSIS interpreted its mandate under
section 12 of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act22 as authorization for the destruction of raw intelligence once analytical summaries
had been prepared. This policy placed the interest of secrecy over the
need to ensure that the raw intelligence was available in subsequent legal
proceedings. This absolutist approach to secrecy caused problems that
contributed to both pre- and post-bombing failures in the Air India
investigation. Intelligence that should have been more widely distributed
before the 1985 bombing was not distributed and important wiretaps and
interview notes were destroyed by CSIS after the bombing. Delays in the
Air India investigation and the collapse of related prosecutions of alleged
Sikh terrorism in the 1980s and the 1990s over disclosure issues meant
that the two-court system contemplated by section 38 remained untested.
Many of the lessons about the possible evidentiary value of secret
intelligence should have been learned from the Air India failures.
Nevertheless, they only started to be learned after September 11 and the

18
Chair Hon. William Kelly, Terrorism: The Report of the Senate Special Committee on
Terrorism and the Public Safety (Ottawa: Ministry of Supply and Services, 1987), at 41.
19
Id.
20
Henrie, supra, note 16, at 577-78.
21
[2008] S.C.J. No. 39, [2008] 2 S.C.R. 326 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Charkaoui”].
22
R.S.C. 1985, c. C-23 [hereinafter “CSIS Act”].
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enactment of the Anti-terrorism Act.23 Many of the new terrorist offences
meant that intelligence created to warn governments about possible risks
of terrorism could also be used as evidence of new terrorist crimes. The
use of intelligence as evidence in a criminal trial would require the
government to sacrifice its claims of secrecy given that criminal trials do
not allow the use of secret evidence. The use of immigration law security
certificates as the main form of anti-terrorism law in Canada between
2001 and 2004, however, meant that the two-court system contemplated
by section 38 and the difficult relation between evidence and intelligence
continued to remain untested.
No security certificate has been issued in a terrorist case in Canada
since 2003 and there has been an increased emphasis on criminal
prosecutions of suspected terrorists. The use of prosecutions represents a
more appropriate response to a terrorist threat that as the Air India
bombing underlines is by no means limited to non-citizens. Terrorism
prosecutions, however, make increased use of section 38 inevitable.
Section 38 was avoided in the Air India trial, but only because defence
counsel were allowed to inspect CSIS material to determine whether it
was relevant on an undertaking that the information not be shared with
the accused unless approved for disclosure by either the Attorney
General of Canada or the courts. As the Supreme Court noted in Ahmad
2011, this approach allowed the challenging prosecution to be completed
and decided on the merits.24 This way of avoiding the two-court approach, however, was disapproved by the Court in R. v. Basi25 and
subsequently in Ahmad 2011 even though similar undertakings by
defence counsel are used in both Australia and the United States.26 The
two-court system was also not used in the Toronto terrorism prosecution
because the trial judge, Dawson J., in Ahmad 2011 ruled that the twocourt system violated the accused’s right to a fair trial under the Charter
and the constitutionally guaranteed jurisdiction of the provincial superior
courts.27 The Court’s categorical disapproval of the undertakings approach and its reversal in Ahmad 2011 of Dawson J.’s constitutional
23

S.C. 2001, c. 41.
Supra, note 1, at para. 11.
25
[2009] S.C.J. No. 52, [2009] 3 S.C.R. 389, at paras. 45-46 (S.C.C.).
26
Ahmad 2011, supra, note 1, at para. 49 (S.C.C.). For a defence of such undertakings, see
Michael Code & Kent Roach, “The Role of the Independent Lawyer and Security Certificates”
(2006) 52 Crim. L.Q. 85.
27
R. v. Ahmad, [2009] O.J. No. 6166, 257 C.C.C. (3d) 135 (Ont. S.C.J.) [hereinafter “Ahmad 2009”].
24
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ruling means that section 38 cannot be avoided in future terrorism
prosecutions, despite not being used in Canada’s two most major
terrorism prosecutions, the Air India trial and the Toronto terrorism
prosecution.
Another factor that makes the use of the two-court system under section 38 inevitable is that there will often be overlapping security intelligence and police investigations in cases of suspected terrorism. This
overlap reflects the fact that CSIS will have jurisdiction to investigate the
security threat and the police will often have jurisdiction to investigate
the many new terrorist offences created by the 2001 Anti-terrorism Act.28
A related factor is the broad disclosure rights that the accused has under
R. v. Stinchcombe.29 Even if CSIS is considered a third party and not the
Crown for disclosure purposes, the Crown will under R. v. McNeil30 have
an obligation to obtain and, subject to privilege claims, to disclose
relevant information possessed by CSIS. CSIS in turn will have pressing
interests in non-disclosure given that it has generally promised its
sources anonymity (in part relying on the fact that it is not a law enforcement agency) and because of its interests in preserving secrecy
about ongoing investigations often conducted in close cooperation with
foreign agencies. Canada’s status as a net importer of intelligence will
make the government especially concerned that foreign intelligence not
be disclosed. The result is that every major terrorism investigation will
likely involve CSIS and information that the government will claim
should be kept secret and not disclosed to the accused. Hence, every
terrorism prosecution will likely feature section 38 decisions made by the
Federal Court and subject to appeal to the Federal Court of Appeal.
In his preliminary report on Air India, Bob Rae identified the dangers
of continuing to ignore the potential evidential relevance of secret
intelligence. He pointedly observed that
if an agency believes that its mission does not include law enforcement,
it should hardly be surprising that its agents do not believe they are in
the business of collecting evidence for use in a trial. But this misses the
point that in an age where terrorism and its ancillary activities are

28
29
30

S.C. 2001, c. 41.
[1991] S.C.J. No. 83, [1991] 3 S.C.R. 326 (S.C.C.).
[2009] S.C.J. No. 3, [2009] 1 S.C.R. 66 (S.C.C.).
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clearly crimes, the surveillance of potentially violent behavior may
ultimately be connected to law enforcement.31

In its 2010 report, the Air India Commission devoted considerable
attention to the importance of section 38 non-disclosure proceedings in
terrorism prosecutions. The Commission accepted broad disclosure
including disclosure from CSIS as a constitutional reality. Rather, it
focused on improving the efficiency and fairness of the section 38
process by allowing criminal trial judges to make such determinations.32
It expressed concerns that an accused in a terrorism prosecution “might
use the two-court approach … to sabotage a terrorism prosecution by
trying to call evidence that leads to s. 38 litigation in Federal Court”.33 It
found the two-court system to be unworkable and potentially unfair.
Although the trial judge could issue a stay of proceedings as a result of
the Federal Court’s non-disclosure order “the trial judge has no authority
to impose what will often be the most appropriate remedy — revision of
the Federal Court’s non-disclosure order in light of changed circumstances”.34 A trial judge who had not seen the non-disclosed information
“might wrongly conclude that the accused does not need that secret
intelligence to make full answer and defence. The result would be an
unfair trial”.35 Federal Court judges making section 38 determinations
often before the trial has started will not have full information about the
trial so as to evaluate the potential importance of the information.
Appeals under section 38.09 could delay terrorism prosecutions and the
Commission recommended that section 38 determinations be subject to
appeal at the end of a criminal trial. The Air India Commission’s recommendation that criminal trial judges be allowed to make section 38
determinations was consistent with the approach taken in the ongoing
Toronto terrorism prosecution, though the trial judgment in Ahmad was
not mentioned in the Air India report because of concerns about the
publication ban then in place.
31

Hon. Bob Rae, Lessons to be Learned (Ottawa: Air India Review Secretariat, 2005), at 23.
Air India Flight 182: A Canadian Tragedy. Final Report of the Commission of Inquiry
into the Investigation of the Bombing of Air India Flight 182 (Major Commission), vol. 3 (Canadian
Government Publishing, 2010) recommendation 14, at 126 [hereinafter “Air India Report”]. I
disclose that I served as Director of Research (Legal Studies) for the Commission and prepared a
research monograph recommending that trial judges be able to make s. 38 determinations.
33
Id., at 154.
34
Id., at 160.
35
Id., at 161.
32

(2011), 54 S.C.L.R. (2d)

CONSTITUTIONAL CHICKEN

367

The Court in Ahmad 2011 took note of the Air India Commission’s
recommendations, but distanced itself from them by noting that “the
Commissioner’s concerns were largely tied to the inability of trial judges
to obtain information about, or access to, the withheld material, which
we hope to have addressed in a practical way in this ruling”.36 The Court
was correct that the Air India Commission assumed that the trial judge
would not have access to the non-disclosed material. The Court, however, was wrong to conclude that the Commission’s grave reservations
about section 38 were limited to such concerns. To repeat, the Commission was also concerned that under section 38 “the trial judge has no
authority to impose what will often be the most appropriate remedyrevision of the Federal Court’s non-disclosure order in light of changed
circumstances”.37 The Commission was also concerned that section 38
allowed what in essence were interlocutory appeals of pre-trial rulings in
terrorism prosecutions that were already burdened by voluminous
disclosure, multiple accused and multiple pre-trial motions. The Court’s
misreading of the Air India report is not a mere academic matter: the
Court’s focus on giving the trial judge access to secret information that
the Federal Court had ordered not to be disclosed fails to confront the
fact that this is only half the dilemma confronting the trial judge. Even if
trial judges after Ahmad have access to the secret non-disclosed information, they remain powerless to revise the initial non-disclosure order
made by the Federal Court. The result may be a stay of proceedings or a
threatened stay when all that is required is an amended redaction or some
substituted form of disclosure. The specially designated Federal Court
judge will not be able to amend a non-disclosure order, especially if it
has been finalized to allow for its appeal to the Federal Court of Appeal.
The Court also argued that the Air India Commission was concerned
with the “wisdom” of the two-court scheme “but the wisdom (as distinguished from the validity) of s. 38 is not a matter for this Court”.38 The
distinction between the constitutionality and the wisdom of legislation is
a long-standing feature of section 7 litigation. It has been emphasized in
the first seminal section 7 cases such as Operation Dismantle Inc. v.
Canada39 and Reference re Motor Vehicle Act (British Columbia)
36
37
38
39

Supra, note 1, at para. 72.
Air India Report, supra, note 32, at 160.
Ahmad 2011, supra, note 1, at para. 75.
[1985] S.C.J. No. 22, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 441 (S.C.C.).
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S. 94(2),40 and later in the Court’s decision in United States of America v.
Burns41 with respect to extradition to face the death penalty. In all these
cases, however, the policy/validity distinction was used to justify
extending section 7 review and not as in Ahmad 2011 in retracting it. The
different uses of the policy/constitutionality distinction reflects different
approaches to judicial review and, as suggested in the third part of this
article, Ahmad 2011 fits into a long line of second-generation Charter
cases where the Court has preferred to engage in creative statutory
interpretation to avoid invalidating potentially unconstitutional laws.
Does the Court’s decision in Ahmad 2011 really suggest that policy
considerations are out of bounds for the Court? It is interesting to
compare the Supreme Court’s 2008 decision in Charkaoui42with its 2011
decision in Ahmad. Charkaoui contained detailed policy discussions
about CSIS’s formation and its subsequent evolution given the increasing
importance of terrorism to its mandate. In reaching its conclusion that
CSIS had erred in its long-standing interpretation of section 12 of the
CSIS Act as justifying the destruction of raw intelligence, the Court
stressed that while “CSIS is not a police force … it must be acknowledged that the activities of the RCMP and those of CSIS have in some
respects been converging as they, and the country, have become increasingly concerned about domestic and international terrorism”.43 Policy
concerns seemed to drive the Court’s interpretation of the CSIS Act. In
contrast, policy concerns were distinguished from constitutional concerns
in Ahmad 2011 and left to Parliament even though in Ahmad 2011, the
Court also reinterpreted security legislation. This suggests that one of the
most effective constitutional defences of impugned legislation will be for
the government to defend the law as a policy choice that Parliament was
entitled to make. It also suggests that parties may be well advised to
make policy arguments at the level of statutory interpretation without
asking courts to make constitutional rulings.

40
41
42
43

[1985] S.C.J. No. 73, [1985] 2 S.C.R. 486 (S.C.C.).
[2001] S.C.J. No. 8, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 283 (S.C.C.).
Supra, note 21.
Id., at para. 26.
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III. THE TRIAL JUDGE’S RULING
The trial judge’s 158-paragraph ruling that section 38 of the Canada
Evidence Act44 was unconstitutional remained subject to a publication
ban for some time and is only briefly described in one paragraph of the
Supreme Court’s ruling. The factums of the parties are also no longer
available from the Supreme Court’s website. Finally, the Supreme Court
repeatedly stressed that its approach to section 38 was a “practical”45
one, even though appellate courts often defer to trial judges on practical
matters relating to pre-trial and trial processes. For these reasons, the trial
judge’s ruling and the related arguments made by the parties on the direct
appeal to the Supreme Court will be examined in some detail.
The trial judge was influenced by the fact that section 38 national
security confidentiality matters could arise throughout pre-trial and trial
proceedings of a long and complex terrorism prosecution before a jury.
For example, he noted that section 38 would be asserted at the preliminary stage of reviewing the adequacy of wiretap warrants and as such
might prevent him as a trial judge from providing the accused with
enough disclosure to exercise his right to full answer and defence in
challenging the warrant. The trial judge also was aware that section 38
issues could be raised with regards to entrapment and state illegality
claims made by the accused as well as those relating to whether the CSIS
investigation became so focused on criminality that criminal protections
would apply.46 National security confidentiality issues could also arise
with respect to issues involving the credibility of informers who had
been transferred from CSIS to the RCMP.47 The trial judge, who was
faced with the difficulties of managing a sprawling and unpredictable
trial, was very influenced by concerns that section 38 issues were
pervasive and likely to arise at nearly every turn in the pre-trial and trial
process.
The trial judge was also influenced by the fact that section 38 rulings
by the Federal Court were subject to appeal as of right to the Federal
Court of Appeal with the possibility of appeal with leave to the Supreme

44
45
46

R.S.C. 1985, c. C-5.
Ahmad 2011, supra, note 1, at para. 72.
The so-called issues under R. v. Jarvis, [2002] S.C.J. No. 76, [2002] 3 S.C.R. 757

(S.C.C.).
47

Ahmad 2009, supra, note 27, at para. 38.
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Court of Canada.48 He adverted to the fact that a mistrial had already
been declared in one trial while such appeals were undertaken.49 He
might also have adverted to the fact that two such appeals were taken in
the Khawaja terrorism prosecution with leave to appeal to the Supreme
Court of Canada being refused in one of the appeals.50 The trial judge
predicted that at least two such interlocutory appeals would happen
during the trial and that at least one of them might occur with a jury
empanelled raising the risk of a mistrial.51 None of these practical
concerns were highlighted in the Supreme Court’s judgment.
Another important contextual factor that influenced the trial judge
was his awareness that the decision to contest and appeal section 38
matters would not be made by the prosecutors, but by separate counsel
for the Attorney General of Canada.52 The bifurcation of prosecutorial
and section 38 functions adds another layer of complexity to the bifurcated proceedings. Various courts and commissions of inquiry have
found that the Attorney General of Canada has repeatedly overclaimed
national security confidentiality.53 This concern lingers unspoken yet
present in the background of the trial judge’s decision. In contrast, the
Supreme Court seemed to assume that a practical approach to section 38
would prevent the Attorney General of Canada from overclaiming
secrecy. The Court’s assumption seems to be that the Attorney General
will be in the best position to decide the respective importance of
keeping secrets and continuing with the prosecution. The bifurcation of
section 38 proceedings from other prosecutorial decisions, however,
creates a risk that secrecy claims and appeals will be viewed without
adequate attention to the harm that they can cause to both efficient and
fair prosecutions. The Air India Commission responded to this concern
by recommending an end to bifurcated prosecutorial decisions by the
creation of a specialized Director of Terrorism Prosecutions who would
handle both section 38 and other prosecutorial matters. Such an approach
might help assure that those who make section 38 secrecy claims would
48
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be fully aware of their effects in delaying and disrupting prosecutions.
The government has, however, decided not to follow this recommendation in its response to the Air India Commission.54
The trial judge stressed that section 38 might prevent him from protecting the accused’s Charter rights. He concluded that “this court may,
as a result of the application of s. 38, be prevented from even privately
seeing the evidence that is critical to determining whether the fair trial
interests of the accused have been violated”.55 The trial judge recognized
that section 38 claims would affect the accused’s right to disclosure and
full answer and defence.56 Similarly, Dawson J. concluded that section 38
claims at the pre-trial stage of challenging a warrant might make it
impossible for him to determine whether the accused’s rights against
unreasonable search and seizure was violated.57 The accused stressed
these Charter concerns in their written arguments to the Supreme Court.
The trial judge took a more contextual approach to the task of ensuring
Charter compliance with respect to disclosure and searches and seizures
than the Supreme Court which stressed in a more abstract manner the
theoretical ability of the trial judge to issue a statutory stay under section
38.14 when necessary to protect a fair trial. The Supreme Court stressed
the ultimate issue of the fairness of the trial, but the trial judge focused
on the component parts of a fair trial.
The trial judge also took a more contextual approach to what is actually required under section 38.06 in reconciling competing interests in
secrecy and disclosure than the Supreme Court, which tended to presume
that the Federal Court would make non-disclosure orders. The trial judge
stressed that “s. 38 does not create a class privilege. Parliament has
prescribed a balancing that must take place on a case by case basis. A
judge is permitted to see the information, just not the judge who must
decide important issues to which the balancing is germane”.58 Implicit in
this statement was a recognition that the trial judge would be in a better
position than the Federal Court judge to decide exactly how much
disclosure was required for a fair trial. The trial judge also recognized
that disclosure and secrecy were not necessarily zero-sum matters and
54
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partial forms of disclosure including the use of redactions and summaries
could be appropriate. This flexible process of balancing the competing
needs for disclosure and secrecy could be influenced by matters that
could change as the trial progressed. For example, ongoing investigations
might have evolved, foreign agencies might lift restrictions or caveats on
the disclosure of information and additional measures might be taken to
protect informers and witnesses. Most importantly, the crystallization of
the issues at trial might affect the accused’s need for disclosure. Only the
trial judge was in a position to monitor these changing dynamics and to
adjust non-disclosure orders in a nuanced and flexible manner. Unlike
the Supreme Court, the trial judge looked beyond the battle of whether
he could gain access to any secret evidence that the Federal Court
ordered not be disclosed to the issue of the appropriate balance between
the need for secrecy and disclosure as it evolved during a long trial.
The trial judge recognized that the judges of the Federal Court who
had been specially designated to hear section 38 matters had developed
expertise in national security and had access to secure facilities and
worked with officials with top secret security clearances. The Attorney
General of Canada in its factum to the Supreme Court of Canada stressed
such matters noting that the judges had participated in various conferences on security matters, had regular meetings with judges from other
jurisdictions and received presentations on issues such as human rights in
the national security context and the evolution of al-Qaeda.59 The trial
judge, however, wisely concluded that the debate about the relative
expertise of the Federal and provincial superior courts was “a mug’s
game”60 given that the superior courts had expertise in other matters
relevant to section 38 including the rights of the accused. Moreover, he
recognized trial judges could develop the relevant national security
expertise and facilities to safely keep secret information.
Both the trial judge and the Supreme Court implicitly rejected arguments raised on appeal by a number of the accused that the Federal
Court’s expertise in national security matters adversely affected its
judicial independence. The Supreme Court had rejected similar concerns
about the independence of the Federal Court when it heard secret
evidence ex parte in security certificate cases while still finding that the
security certificate regime was unconstitutional in not providing for any
59
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adversarial challenge of the secret evidence that CSIS and federal
lawyers presented to Federal Court judges.61 Both cases can be seen as an
affirmation of the important role of the Federal Court in national security
matters. At the same time, it is telling that the independence of the
Federal Court was challenged in both cases. This is not a criticism of the
integrity or quality of those who sit on the Federal Court, but rather a
point about the institutional position of a court that is statutorily required
to consider ex parte considerations from the government62 and that can
by statute have its decision to disclose sensitive material effectively
reversed by a certificate issued by the Attorney General of Canada.63 The
specially designated judges of the Federal Court are repeat players on
security matters. As such, they may be susceptible to anxieties about both
the nature of the security threats that Canada faces and the importance of
ensuring that secret information that more powerful allies share with
Canada is not disclosed.
The conduct of the Toronto terrorism trial suggests that trial judges
can manage the responsibilities of deciding national security confidentiality claims. The trial judge was provided with secure laptops to examine
the documents in dispute.64 The accused requested disclosure of documents held by both the Crown and by CSIS with the judge determining
that the slightly more restrictive R. v. O’Connor65 scheme for obtaining
disclosure from third parties applied to the CSIS documents. As anticipated in the original ruling on the constitutionality of section 38, the
accused’s disclosure requests were wide-ranging and included issues
relating to the wiretap warrants, entrapment and the credibility of various
agents.66 At the same time, the accused accepted that information about
unrelated individuals and internal police matters as well as information
covered by solicitor-client and informant privilege would not be disclosed.67 The accused did not agree to ex parte hearings that would be
allowed under section 38 for both the Crown and the accused, but did
61

Charkaoui v. Canada, [2007] S.C.J. No. 9, [2007] 1 S.C.R. 350 (S.C.C.).
For a recognition of the unfairness of ex parte communications in other contexts, see
Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v. Tobiass, [1997] S.C.J. No. 82, [1997] 3 S.C.R.
391 (S.C.C.).
63
Canada Evidence Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-5, s. 38.13. A very deferential form of judicial
review of the certificate is available under s. 38.131.
64
R. v. Ahmad Ruling 16, [2009] O.J. No. 6156, at para. 2 (Ont. S.C.J.).
65
[1995] S.C.J. No. 98, [1995] 4 S.C.R. 411 (S.C.C.).
66
R. v. Ahmad Ruling 16, supra, note 64, at para. 8.
67
Id., at para. 9.
62

374

SUPREME COURT LAW REVIEW

(2011), 54 S.C.L.R. (2d)

allow the trial judge and the Crown to engage in written ex parte communications which were then preserved under seal.68 The trial judge
described the approach taken as follows:
The procedure we have followed is akin to a Garofoli procedure: R. v.
Garofoli, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 1421. The Crown and I can see the
documents in their entire unredacted form. The accused and their
counsel cannot. We have gone through the redactions one by one.
Occasionally I have been able to give the accused some information
about the redacted information when certain that doing so would not
impinge on a protected interest. Crown counsel has done the same
thing.69

The trial judge with the consent of the accused allowed the Crown to
review his draft reasons with respect to inadvertent disclosure of secrets
and also issued some private reasons.70
The trial judge upheld most of the government’s redactions in hundreds of documents on various grounds including that they would tend to
identify sources or investigative techniques or breach restrictions on
disclosure imposed by foreign agencies. There is no evidence that the
trial judge acted irresponsibly with respect to national security interests
even though he did not have the benefit of the specialized education and
experience accumulated by the specially designated judges of the Federal
Court. The trial judge did, however, order that information that was
relevant to the credibility of a police agent including his payment should
be disclosed,71 but this was a matter within the expertise of a criminal
trial judge.
Somewhat disturbingly, the trial judge did not have access to all the
relevant information, but he concluded that “I am satisfied that the
obviously highly sensitive information I am not able to view goes
beyond what I need know to properly address the issues before me.”72
Although the process was not without difficulties, trial judges are capable
of making national security confidentiality decisions while also maintaining secrecy when required. The idea that only specially designated judges
of the Federal Court can appreciate the harms of disclosure to national
security does not make sense in a country that prides itself on a generalist
68
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and able judiciary. Even if the Federal Court judges are more sophisticated with respect to harms to national security, they are only one side of
the section 38 equation and judges must also consider harms of nondisclosure to the accused’s right to a fair trial.
Having found a violation of section 7 of the Charter, the trial judge
addressed the issue of whether the violation could be justified under
section 1. This meant that the trial judge considered whether there were
reasonable alternatives to the two-court system and concluded that
the s. 38 scheme fails to meet the minimal impairment component of
the Oakes test. Adequate protection for sensitive information can be
provided in the Superior Court of Justice. As the court where the fair
trial rights of the accused are at stake, the Superior Court of Justice is in
the best position to both access and assess the evidence, and to evaluate
the relationship of all relevant factors during the balancing process.
Accordingly, the Crown has failed to justify the violation of s. 7 of the
Charter on the basis that s. 38 is a reasonable limit in accordance with
s. 1 of the Charter.73

The trial judge’s approach engaged questions of proportionality and less
restrictive alternatives that the Supreme Court did not reach because they
found that there was no section 7 violation. The question of less rights
restrictive alternatives that the trial judge found central to his section 1
analysis was characterized by the Supreme Court as a matter of policy
best left to Parliament. This contrast underlines the malleable nature of
section 1 analysis and proportionality reasoning which can be characterized as matters of law that judges can decide or matters of policy that
should be left to Parliament.
Although the Supreme Court stressed that it was necessary to take a
“practical” approach to section 38 matters, its own analysis downplayed
the practical matters of pre-trial motions for disclosure and challenging
warrants, appeals and bifurcated counsel that made the two-court system
even more unwieldy. The Supreme Court relied on the theoretical ability
of trial judges to stay proceedings without perhaps fully appreciating the
drastic consequence of staying a major prosecution. The trial judge,
unlike the Supreme Court, appreciated that what might be required to
protect a fair trial might not be the atom bomb of a stay of proceedings,
but more tailored remedies that would revise non-disclosure orders made
at the pre-trial stage in light of the evolving nature of the trial and the
73
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flexible balancing that is required under section 38 to reconcile competing interests in secrecy and disclosure.

IV. THE SUPREME COURT’S DECISION
The case was directly appealed to the Supreme Court as a final decision not otherwise subject to appeal. The Court, in a unanimous “by the
Court” judgment, overruled the trial judge with respect to both his
findings of a violation of section 7 of the Charter and section 96 of the
Constitution Act, 1867. The Court interpreted or read down section 38 to
ensure that it accorded with the right to a fair trial even while acknowledging that the two-court system might cause “numerous practical and
legal difficulties”.74 The Court stressed that Parliament must have
intended that the trial judge have access to secret information that was
not disclosed given the responsibility placed on the trial judge to ensure
the fairness of the criminal trial including the explicit recognition in
section 38.14 that the trial judge could stay proceedings if a fair trial was
not possible. At the same time, however, the Court did not interpret
section 38 as guaranteeing that the trial judge would have such access.
Instead, it relied on the ability of a constitutional game of chicken and
the threat of a stay to ensure such access.
The Court’s approach to the constitutional question was somewhat
similar to the reading down approach used in R. v. Butler,75 R. v. Sharpe76
and Canadian Foundation for Children, Youth and the Law v. Canada
(Attorney General).77 In other words, the Court relied heavily on a
presumption that Parliament intended to comply with the Charter.78 The
Court’s approach in these matters can be seen as a form of secondgeneration constitutionalism in which it avoids the reliance placed on
declarations of constitutional invalidity seen in early Charter cases such
as Hunter v. Southam Inc.79 that did not attempt to cure constitutional
defects. The use of robust reading down remedies in Ahmad 2011
presents less of a danger than in cases where the creatively interpreted
legislation may provide inaccurate or unclear signals to the public.
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Section 38 is administered by the designated Federal Court judges, trial
judges and the Attorney General of Canada. These legal professionals
can reasonably be expected to be familiar with the nuances contemplated
by Ahmad 2011 as opposed to the many citizens who might be affected
by obscenity provisions or those relating to the correction of children.
Nevertheless, reading down approaches presume that those who administer potentially unconstitutional laws will always exercise their discretion
in a manner that is consistent with the Charter as it has been interpreted
by the Court. As will be seen, the Court’s approach in Ahmad 2011 places
special burdens on trial judges to threaten and impose stays to protect
risks to fair trial rights even when those stays might not be justified
under restrictive common law or Charter requirements.
The Court’s actual reading down of section 38 was quite minimal.
Even though section 38.04(5)(c)(i) appeared to give the Federal Court
judge discretion in deciding who should receive notice of section 38
proceedings, the Court declared that it:
should be read as requiring notice to the criminal court that a s. 38
proceeding has been commenced in Federal Court. … Given that the
criminal trial judge will require notice to effectively discharge the duty
to protect the accused’s legal rights under the Charter, it will always be
the case (subject of course to the other provisions of that Act) that he or
she “should” be given notice. The word “may” in s. 38.07 will similarly
be understood to require that notice of the Federal Court judge’s final
order be given to the trial judge. Although the determination whether to
give notice to a criminal trial judge is not discretionary, the content of
that notice remains at the discretion of the designated judge. This will
vary with the different circumstances of each case.80

The Court also suggested that the Federal Court “exercising the discretion conferred by s. 38.06(2)” might order that information could be
disclosed to the trial judge subject only to the condition that it not be
disclosed to the accused and that it be reviewed by the trial judge in a
“designated secure facility”. Without noting that the trial judge had
successfully used such secure methods in this case, the Court nevertheless expressed some trust in trial judges by observing that there was
“minimal risk” in “providing such access to a trial judge, who is entrusted with the powers and responsibilities of high public office”.81
80
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The Court also held that “absent compelling reasons to the contrary,
the Federal Court judge should generally order that notice of the existence of the proceedings in the Federal Court be given to the accused in
the criminal trial”.82 Notice to the accused will alert the accused to the
section 38 proceedings and likely lead to an application to the trial judge
for a stay of proceedings under section 38.14. At the same time, however,
the accused may not receive notice of the particulars of the information
that the Federal Court might order not be disclosed.
The Supreme Court stressed that stays of proceedings under section
38.14 would play a critical role in the administration of section 38.
Section 38.14 also mentions other less drastic remedies including adverse
findings on an issue relating to information that cannot be disclosed and
any other order “to protect the right of the accused to a fair trial” so long
as it complies with the Federal Court’s non-disclosure order. The potentially wide range of remedies contemplated under section 38.14 will,
however, be foreclosed by the need to respect Federal Court nondisclosure orders typically provided at the pre-trial stage. In many
jurisdictions that allow the trial judge to make such non-disclosure
orders, the ability of the trial judge to re-visit and revise such orders is
seen as the critical means of ensuring the fairness of the trial. The House
of Lords, for example, has stressed that a trial judge’s non-disclosure
order “should not be treated as a final, once-and-for-all, answer but as a
provisional answer which the court must keep under review”.83 The
European Court of Human Rights has similarly stressed the important
role of the trial judge who is “in a position to monitor the need for
disclosure throughout the trial, assessing the importance of the undisclosed evidence at a stage when new issues were emerging, when it
might have been possible through cross-examination seriously to
undermine the credibility of key witnesses” and as the defence case
evolves “to take a number of different directions or emphases”.84 Given
the inability of Canadian trial judges under section 38.14 to revise nondisclosure orders, the Supreme Court was correct to stress that the drastic
remedy of a stay of proceedings will often be the only practical remedy
available to the trial judge to ensure the fairness of the trial.
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The stay of proceedings under section 38.14 — or at least the threat
of such a drastic remedy — will play the critical role in the constitutional
game of chicken that will be played under the two-court system. In a
critical passage in Ahmad 2011, the Court rules that if “there is simply
not enough information to decide whether or not trial fairness has been
materially affected, the trial judge must presume that the non-disclosure
order has adversely affected the fairness of the trial, including the right of
the accused to make full answer and defence”.85 The Court has thus
instructed trial judges that any doubts about the fairness of the trial must
be resolved in favour of the accused’s application for a stay.86 The Court
recognized that such an approach was in tension to common law and
Charter doctrines that stressed that stays of proceedings are a drastic
remedy that must be reserved for the clearest of cases. Nevertheless, the
Court stressed that stays “are an expressly contemplated remedy under s.
38.14 to protect the fair trial rights of the accused from the adverse
impact of non-disclosure”.87
The Court’s reliance on the statutory nature of stays in section 38.14
raises the question of what the Court would have done had Parliament
not specifically mentioned stays in section 38.14. In principle, the need
to protect the accused’s right to a fair trial should be the same, but the
Court’s emphasis on Parliament’s decision to authorize stays suggests
that the Court’s endorsement of the stay remedy might have been less
robust if Parliament had not made reference to stays. The Court’s
approach seeks to distance both the judiciary and the Charter from
responsibility for stays of proceedings. This avoidance of responsibility
is most graphic when the Court asserts that “Parliament has determined
that a stay of proceedings is the lesser evil compared with the disclosure
of sensitive or potentially injurious information”.88 Although the Court
places considerable reliance on statutory recognition of the availability of
stays under section 38.14, the constitutional calculus arguably should
have been the same with or without section 38.14.89 With or without
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section 38.14, trial judges should have a constitutional responsibility to
ensure the fairness of trials.
Statutory stays of proceedings are the ultimate threat in the constitutional game of chicken, but the Court expressed confidence that they
“should be rare”.90 One reason for the Court’s confidence was its
expectation that both Federal Court judges and the Attorney General of
Canada would apply section 38 in a flexible manner to give the trial
judge enough information to decide whether non-disclosure or partial
disclosure would actually threaten a fair trial. Even if this was not done
in the first instance, the Court contemplated that the actors would have a
second chance to come to their senses. It stated that trial judges should
“rather than proceed directly to issuance of a stay”,91 advise the Attorney
General of Canada and “the Attorney General will then have an opportunity to make further and better disclosure under the Attorney General
certificate procedure to address the trial judge’s concerns. If no (or
inadequate) additional information can be provided to the trial judge, a
stay of proceedings will be the presumptively appropriate remedy”.92
Here the Court seems to contemplate an actual game of chicken where
the trial judge threatens to stay a major prosecution as a means to obtain
disclosure.
The game of chicken contemplated by the Court is not played out
between two courts with overlapping jurisdiction over terrorism prosecutions, but between the trial judge and the Attorney General of Canada.
The Federal Court judge who made the initial non-disclosure decision
the exercise by the trial judge of the s. 38.14 statutory remedy is not constrained by the
ordinary Charter jurisprudence concerning abuse of process. Neither is it constrained by
the ordinary Charter jurisprudence in relation, for example, to trial within a reasonable
time. If the trial process resulting from the application of the s. 38 scheme becomes unmanageable by virtue of excessive gaps between the hearing of the evidence or other such
impediments, such that the right of the accused to a fair trial is compromised, the trial
judge should not hesitate to use the broad authority Parliament has conferred under s.
38.14 to put an end to the prosecution.
In reality, the Court has since the early years of the Charter clung to the proposition that a stay of
proceedings should be the court’s minimal remedy for a violation of s. 11(b) of the Charter. See R. v. Rahey,
[1987] S.C.J. No. 23, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 588 (S.C.C.). For arguments that stress how bifurcated s. 38
proceedings and appeals may delay mega-terrorism trials, see Hon. Patrick LeSage & Professor Michael
Code for The Ontario Ministry of the Attorney General, Report of the Review of Large and Complex
Criminal Case Procedures (Toronto: Queen’s Printer, November 2008), at 91-93, online:
<http://www.attorneygeneral.jus.gov.on.ca/english/about/pubs/lesage_code/lesage_code_report_en.pdf>.
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drops out as a player if only because that order will have to be finalized,
often at the pre-trial stage, so that appeal provisions of section 38.09
would apply. This approach recognizes the reality that the Attorney
General of Canada has to make the ultimate decision of whether to
prosecute and disclose.93 At the same time, however, the Court did not
advert to the adverse effects of a bifurcation of prosecutorial and section
38 decision-making. Terrorism prosecutions will be conducted by the
federal Director of Public Prosecutions and/or provincial prosecutors, but
as the trial judge stressed, section 38 matters are conducted by a separate
group of lawyers representing the Attorney General of Canada. The trial
judge was concerned that section 38 decisions could be made by the
latter group of lawyers without adequate consideration of their effect on
the overall prosecution. Indeed, there is a danger that the section 38
lawyers may serve the interests of client departments, notably CSIS, in
secrecy without full regard to how non-disclosure decisions may threaten
the trial process. The Supreme Court in Ahmad 2011 assumed that the
threat of a stay of proceedings would place appropriate pressure on the
Attorney General of Canada to make full disclosure at least to the trial
judge. Indeed at times, the Court assumed that “Crown counsel”94
representing the government was one entity despite the trial judge’s
explicit comments about the bifurcation of section 38 and other prosecutorial functions.
The Court’s determination that section 96 was not violated by section
38 is consistent with Peter Hogg’s observations that the Court has set “a
high bar indeed for a challenge to judicial independence based on
adjudicative independence” and that such a deferential approach “stands
in sharp contrast to the Court’s readiness to find a breach of judicial
independence in any reduction of the salaries or prerequisites of
judges”.95 The Court rejected the section 96 claim by holding that the
93
The Air India Commission, for example, stressed that through non-disclosure certificates
under s. 38.13 that the Attorney General of Canada had the “ultimate responsibility … with respect
to the disclosure of intelligence”. The Commission, however, also recommended that a Director of
Terrorism Prosecutions be created in the Attorney General of Canada’s department that would have
ultimate responsibility for both prosecutorial and s. 38 decisions.
94
For example, the Court stated that “Crown counsel will also have an important role to
play as the proceedings unfold. For example, if it becomes obvious to the Crown that non-disclosure
under s. 38 will significantly and irreparably impact trial fairness, then the Crown itself ought
normally to enter a stay of proceedings.” Ahmad 2011, supra, note 1, at para. 46.
95
Peter Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada, 5th ed. (Toronto: Thomson Carswell, 2007),
at 7.1(c), as updated.

382

SUPREME COURT LAW REVIEW

(2011), 54 S.C.L.R. (2d)

first part of the Reference re Residential Tenancies Act 1979 (Ontario)96
test was not made out because “in 1867, Crown claims to refuse disclosure of potentially injurious or sensitive information were generally
considered by superior courts in Canada to be a matter of unreviewable
executive prerogative”.97 The Ontario Court of Appeal has used similar
reasoning to reject a similar challenge to the role that section 38 gives
specially designated Federal Court judges in civil actions brought in a
provincial superior court.98 The problem with such reasoning is that it
relies on the anachronistic attitudes of Canadian courts toward secrecy.
This approach reveals section 96 as a pocket of historical framers intent
jurisprudence that is in tension with the general “living tree” approach
taken in other aspects of constitutional interpretation.
The Court in Ahmad 2011 to its credit, did not simply rely on the
easy and unsatisfying answer that courts in 1867 would not review
executive claims of secrecy. It went on to the second test in Residential
Tenancies,99 namely, whether the power to determine section 38 matters
was a judicial matter. The Court accepted that “a superior court’s ability
to adjudicate the constitutional issues that come before it forms a part of
the essential core”100 of the functions of a superior court. It then characterized section 38 matters more narrowly as the disclosure of material
where national security confidentiality was claimed.101 This approach
followed a similar approach taken in the Cabinet confidentiality case of
Babcock v. Canada (Attorney General).102 Babcock, however, could have
been distinguished on the basis that national security confidentiality
claims in criminal trials are inextricably intertwined with the constitutional question of whether a fair trial was possible in a way that Cabinet
confidentiality claims are not. The Court implicitly recognized the
constitutional stakes of national security confidentiality claims in
criminal trials, but held that they were satisfied by the ability of trial
judges to stay proceedings under section 38.14. At this juncture, however, the Court recognized that the Charter would sometimes mandate the
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use of a stay of proceedings.103 This conclusion, however, undermines
the idea that section 38 is practically distinct from the adjudication of
constitutional issues. Section 96 emerges as a weak device to protect the
separation of powers both because of the Court’s historicist approach to
essential superior court functions and its tendency to define the claimed
core of superior court functions in narrow terms that avoid the constitutional essence of disclosure and non-disclosure in the context of a
criminal trial.
In summary, the Court’s reading down of section 38 to avoid constitutional violations promises more than it delivers. The Court’s only
reading down remedy is to require that the trial judge receive notice of
related section 38 proceedings being conducted in the Federal Court. The
Court does not interpret section 38 to ensure that the Federal Court or the
Attorney General give the trial judge access to non-disclosed information
that might nevertheless be relevant to the criminal trial. Even if the threat
of the trial judge staying proceedings is sufficient in most cases to ensure
that the trial judge will now be able to see the undisclosed information,
the trial judge will remain powerless to revise the Federal Court’s nondisclosure order. Such revisions are common in other democracies and
they may often be more appropriate and less drastic than the statutory
stay of proceedings that the Supreme Court celebrates as the key to
ensuring that the accused’s fair trial rights and the guaranteed powers of
superior trial courts are respected.

V. THE FUTURE OF CONSTITUTIONAL CHICKEN
Although the Court stresses that its conclusion that section 38 is constitutional does not resolve the policy debate about the wisdom of
Canada’s unique two-court approach to resolving national security
confidentiality claims, it is likely that the Court’s decision will end the
debate. Although the Air India Inquiry and the Lesage/Code Task Force
both concluded that the two-court approach was unworkable, the federal
government in its response to the Air India report did not propose
legislation to give trial judges powers to make section 38 determinations.104 No such changes were included in the government’s bill on fair
103
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and efficient criminal trials that received Royal Assent subsequent to
Ahmad 2011 in June 2011.105
The unique role of the Federal Court in all cases involving national
security secrecy claims reflects long-standing Canadian anxieties about
the disclosure of secret information that, as discussed in the first part of
this article, stem back to the Gouzenko revelations after the Second
World War. Despite the growing numbers of people that are of necessity
given access to secret information in the post-9/11 era, the Supreme
Court’s decision in Ahmad 2011 upholds a restrictive regime that still does
not as a matter of course allow trial judges to have access to secret material
despite the fact that trial judges have access to and make decisions about
potentially life and death matters affecting police informers. In short,
Canada’s unique bifurcated approach to national security confidentiality is
a testament to our continued anxieties about secrets stemming from our
oft-noted status as a net importer of intelligence.
The Federal Court will remain an important national security institution with exclusive jurisdiction to decide not only matters related to
national security confidentiality, but also matters relating to CSIS
warrants, judicial review of the listing of terrorists and security certificates. The Court has in the security certificate context done much
important work and has not always agreed with governmental claims of
secrecy. Yet much will depend on a handful of specially designated
Federal court judges. There is a danger that the court may because of its
repeat player status, its intimate awareness of Canada’s reliance on
foreign intelligence and the serious security threats facing Canada and its
inexperience in criminal trial matters be inclined to favour secrecy claims
over those relating to the accused’s rights. Indeed, the Supreme Court
seems to anticipate this result when it states that “the Federal Court
judge’s sole concern under the scheme is the protection of the public
interest in sensitive or potentially injurious information.106 This statement
is technically inaccurate because section 38.06 of the Canada Evidence
Act,107 unlike security certificate provisions of immigration law, requires
The procedure whereby a judge reviews and balances the competing public interests in
disclosing or not disclosing relevant intelligence information can be time consuming and
subject to change if new evidence is presented during the trial. The current procedure
relies on the Federal Court to appropriately protect sensitive information.
105
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specially designated judges to weigh the competing interests in disclosure and non-disclosure. Nevertheless the Court’s statement is telling in
indicating that the Federal Court may well lean towards the state’s
security and secrecy interests, especially given that the accused’s
competing interests in full answer and defence may not have crystallized
when section 38 decisions are typically made in pre-trial proceedings. If
the two-court system is ultimately about the expertise of the specially
designated Federal Court judge, it must be acknowledged that this
expertise relates to the harms that disclosure of secret information may
cause to national security, national defence and international relations
and not to expertise in protecting the rights of the accused and to fair
criminal trials.
In any event, the specially designated Federal Court judges who
make decisions under section 38 may tend to be minor actors in the
constitutional game of chicken that will be a central feature of terrorism
prosecutions after Ahmad 2011. The real game of chicken will be played
between the trial judge and the Attorney General of Canada. The Supreme Court may have ensured that in most cases the trial judge will be
given more information about material that the Federal Court has ordered
should not be disclosed because of national security concerns. The Court
has also hinted that the Federal Court judge and perhaps also the trial
judge may be assisted by special advocates. Special advocates may play
a helpful role in challenging overclaiming of secrecy, but they may be at
a disadvantage in alerting either the Federal Court or the trial judge to
whether non-disclosure will adversely affect the fairness of the trial
especially if the accused’s defence evolves over time or if the nondisclosed information might reveal some unanticipated line of defence
for the accused and special advocates are restricted from consulting with
the accused and their lawyers after having seen the secret information.
How will Ahmad 2011 affect terrorism and other national security
provisions? Until recently, Canada had a spectacularly poor record of
terrorism prosecutions with various cases in the 1980s and 1990s,
including those against the suspected mastermind of the 1985 Air India
bombing, being abandoned over disclosure issues.108 One non-terrorism
case resulted in a mistrial after section 38 was invoked in the middle of a
108
See generally, Kent Roach, The Unique Challenges of Terrorism Prosecutions: Towards
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jury trial though that person was subsequently convicted.109 As discussed
above, two-court section 38 proceedings were deliberately avoided in
both the Air India and Toronto terrorism prosecutions. Terrorism prosecutions will undoubtedly become more difficult after Ahmad 2011 given
that the expedients used in the Air India trial and Toronto terrorism
prosecution to avoid litigating section 38 issues in the Federal Court will
no longer be available and the threat of a statutory stay under section
38.14 for both fair trial and trial within a reasonable time reasons will
hang over most terrorism prosecutions. Guilty pleas and negotiated
approaches are the only remaining ways to avoid section 38 litigation,
but these may be less likely in light of recent increases in sentencing
tariffs which diminish the incentive for those accused of terrorism to
plead guilty.
It is possible that the regime contemplated under Ahmad 2011 will be
workable, but much will depend on how trial judges and the Attorney
General of Canada play their respective roles. There is a danger that trial
judges may hesitate to threaten to end major terrorism prosecutions
because they may not have all the details about non-disclosed evidence
or even if they do, they may view a stay of proceedings as a manifestly
disproportionate remedy to the harms to the accused of non-disclosure.
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has given trial judges clear instructions
that they should use the statutory stay remedy robustly even if the
remedy would not otherwise be warranted under the common law or the
Charter. The Court has stressed that its decision will put the trial judge in
an informed position to protect the accused’s right to a fair trial, but it
has not grappled with difficulties presented by trial judges being unable
to revise the Federal Court’s original non-disclosure order and having to
rely on the drastic and perhaps disproportionate remedy of a stay of
proceedings. Trial judges will also have to decide whether they should
give the Attorney General guidance about how to revise the nondisclosure order made by the Federal Court or whether they should just
threaten to use the statutory stay under section 38.14.
The Court has attempted to shift responsibility for stays from the trial
judge and the Charter to Parliament. Informed commentators may blame
any subsequent stays of terrorism prosecutions on Parliament’s choice of
109
R. v. Ribic, [2004] O.J. No. 2525 (Ont. S.C.J.). The judge in that case rejected two claims
that extensive delays ranging from five to six years violated the accused’s right to a trial in a
reasonable time, largely on the basis that the accused had initiated the s. 38 proceedings by seeking
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an awkward two-court system, but trial judges will be the ones on the hot
seat. They will be the ones who must actually pull the trigger and end
major terrorism prosecutions that may have attracted national and even
global attention and alarm. Trial judges will have to be willing to play a
game of chicken even if the result is a stay of proceedings in a very
serious case with strong evidence that the accused had planned or even
committed deadly acts of terrorism and even in cases where the revision
of the original non-disclosure order might be a more proportionate and
appropriate remedy. Ahmad 2011 creates risks that trial judges will refuse
to stay proceedings in cases where a non-disclosure order might result in
an unfair trial and potentially a miscarriage of justice. Conversely,
section 38 creates the risk that trial judges will have to stay proceedings
even when the more appropriate response would be to amend the original
non-disclosure order. The risks created by the constitutional game of
chicken inherent in section 38 are unfortunate because giving the trial
judge jurisdiction to make and revise section 38 non-disclosure decisions
would significantly minimize the risk of either unfair trials or unnecessary stays. It would also follow international best practices.
The game of constitutional chicken that emerges from Ahmad 2011
may make it even more important for the federal government to reconsider
the way it prosecutes terrorism cases. When the predecessor of section 38
was first enacted in 1982 and when it was updated in 2001, the Attorney
General of Canada was able to assert ultimate responsibility for criminal
prosecutions involving conduct that constituted threats to the security of
Canada.110 In 2006, however, and without apparent consideration of the
effects that it might have on terrorism prosecutions, an independent federal
Director of Public Prosecutions (“DPP”) was inserted into the prosecutorial mix. As the trial judge but not the Supreme Court noted in Ahmad
2011, this meant that governmental decisions under section 38 would
remain with the Attorney General of Canada even though other lawyers
under the federal Director of Public Prosecutions and/or provincial
Attorneys General would be responsible for the prosecutions.
The Air India Commission recommended that terrorism prosecutions
be returned to the Attorney General of Canada in part because “managing
the relationship between intelligence and evidence is difficult enough
without in addition dividing the prosecution process into two parts by
110
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having the DPP conduct the prosecution and the Attorney General of
Canada make decisions under s. 38”.111 The Air India Commission also
noted that it might be important for the Attorney General to consult his or
her colleagues in Cabinet especially in relation to possible disclosure of
intelligence obtained from foreign agencies.112 The government in its
response to the Air India report ignored these recommendations and
contemplated that the DPP would continue to prosecute terrorism
offences.113 This decision should be revisited in light of Ahmad 2011
given the critical role of the Attorney General of Canada in responding to
provisional stay decisions that will now likely be made by trial judges.
Ahmad 2011 places the Attorney General of Canada in the driver’s seat in
the constitutional game of chicken. Given this, the Attorney General
should be placed in the best position to weigh the costs of disclosure
against those of stayed prosecutions. At present, there is a danger that the
Attorney General may not fully internalize and weigh the costs of a
stayed and terminated prosecution if that official does not bear ultimate
responsibility for the prosecution and if that official sees her role as only
protecting the secrets of Canada and her allies.

VI. CONCLUSION
Ahmad 2011 will make terrorism prosecutions more difficult in the
future. The Court has disapproved of attempts made in both the Air India
trial and in the Toronto terrorism prosecution to avoid using the unique
and awkward two-court system in section 38 of the Canada Evidence
Act114 to determine whether unused intelligence has to be disclosed to the
accused in a terrorism prosecution. Now in almost every terrorism
prosecution, we can expect that criminal trial judges will threaten to stay
proceedings if they do not obtain access to any secret information that
the Federal Court has ordered should not be disclosed because of harms
to national security. Even if trial judges do obtain access to such informa111
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tion, they will remain powerless to revise the Federal Court’s nondisclosure orders. They will have to rely on the blunt and perhaps
disproportionate remedy of a stay to ensure that the accused has a fair
trial. Although the Supreme Court in Ahmad 2011 has stressed that it is
not necessary for common law or Charter standards to be satisfied for the
section 38.14 stay, there is a danger that trial judges may hesitate to
impose a stay in circumstances where a less drastic revision of a nondisclosure order is more appropriate. Although Parliament bears ultimate
responsibility for the two-court structure that forces the trial judge to rely
on a stay, the risk of public backlash against a trial judge who imposes a
stay in a major prosecution such as the Air India or Toronto terrorism
prosecutions is difficult to overestimate. The accused’s right to disclosure
and a fair trial will suffer if trial judges do not have the stomach for
playing their role in the game of constitutional chicken.
The Court in Ahmad 2011 has upheld the role of specially designated
Federal Court judges under section 38, but it is a mistake to think that
those judges will play a key role in the constitutional game of chicken.
They will have the difficult task of reconciling the accused’s right to a
fair trial with the state’s interests in secrecy at a pre-trial stage and their
expertise lies on the secrecy side of the equation. The Federal Court
judges may tailor their non-disclosure orders to allow trial judges within
the ring of secrecy, but they will not be able to revise their section 38
decisions in the middle of a trial, in part because their orders will have to
be finalized to allow them to be appealed to the Federal Court of Appeal
under section 38.09. In most cases, only the Attorney General of Canada
will be able to avoid a stay by allowing secret information to be disclosed despite the Federal Court’s original non-disclosure order.
The stakes of the constitutional game of chicken contemplated by section 38 and now upheld as constitutional in Ahmad 2011 could not be
higher. Although prudent actors may be able to avoid the disasters of
staying a major terrorism prosecution or allowing one to proceed where
important evidence has not been disclosed to the accused, constitutional
games of chicken do not inspire confidence that Canada can conduct
efficient and fair terrorism prosecutions. The Court in Ahmad 2011 may
have assured itself that terrorism prosecutions will remain fair, but only at
the cost of instructing trial judges to threaten to stay proceedings whenever
they are left in doubt about the fairness of the process. Trial judges will
have to use the drastic remedy of a stay in cases where the more appropriate remedy would be to revise the Federal Court’s non-disclosure order
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often made long before the trial has started. The Attorney General of
Canada is ultimately the decisive driver in this game of chicken. Much will
depend on that official’s willingness to ensure that not only the trial judge
but more importantly the accused receives enough disclosure to avoid the
statutory stay that will now hang over most terrorism prosecutions.

